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Abstract 
A longstanding debate in the philosophy of action opposes causalists to anti-causalists. Causalists claim 
the authority of Davidson, who offered powerful arguments to the effect that intentional explanations 
must be causal explanations. Anti-causalists claim the authority of Wittgenstein, who offered equally 
powerful arguments to the effect that reasons cannot be causes. My aim in this paper is to achieve a 
rapprochement between Davidsonian causalists and Wittgensteinian anti-causalists by showing how 
both sides can agree that reasons are not causes, but that intentional explanations are causal explanations. 
To this end, I first defuse Davidson’s Challenge, an argument purporting to show that intentional 
explanations are best made sense of as being explanatory because reasons are causes. I argue that 
Wittgenstein furnishes anti-causalists with the means to resist this conclusion. I then argue that this 
leaves the Master Argument for the claim that intentional explanations are causal explanations, but that 
by distinguishing between a narrow and a wide conception of causal explanation, we can resolve the 
stalemate between Wittgensteinian anti-causalists impressed by the thought that reasons cannot be 
causes and Davidsonian causalists impressed by the thought that intentional explanations must be causal 
explanations. 
 
 
Davidson’s Challenge 
Causalists and anti-causalists in the philosophy of action have been opposing each other 
for decades.1 One side has claimed the authority of Donald Davidson, who offered 
powerful arguments to the effect that intentional explanations must be causal 
explanations—a view that has achieved the status of “a central dogma in many circles 
within philosophy of mind” (Sehon 2016, 4).2 The other side has claimed the authority 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who offered equally powerful arguments to the effect that 
reasons cannot be causes, because reasons are subject to first-person authority in a way 
                                                
1 See Alvarez (2007), Sandis (2009), Candlish and Damnjanovic (2013), D’Oro and Sandis (2013) for 
overviews of the debate. 
2 See Mele (1992, 2003), Bishop (1989), and the essays in Aguilar and Buckareff (2010) for nuanced 
versions of causalist views.  
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in which causes are not; reasons are normally neither physiological processes nor 
(onsets of) mental states, but what our mental states are about, which makes them 
unlikely candidates as causes of action; and reasons justify where causes could not.3 
 My aim in this paper is to achieve a rapprochement between Davidsonian causalists 
and Wittgensteinian anti-causalists by showing how both sides can agree that reasons 
are not causes, but that intentional explanations are causal explanations. To this end, I 
begin by defusing what I call Davidson’s Challenge, an argument purporting to show 
that intentional explanations are best made sense of as being explanatory because 
reasons can be causes.4 I argue that Wittgenstein furnishes anti-causalists with the 
means to resist this conclusion (§1). I then argue that this leaves what I call the Master 
Argument for the claim that intentional explanations are causal explanations, but that 
by distinguishing between a narrow and a wide conception of causal explanation, we 
can resolve the stalemate between Wittgensteinian anti-causalists who are impressed by 
the thought that reasons cannot be causes and Davidsonian causalists who are 
impressed by the thought that intentional explanations must be causal explanations 
(§2). 
 Chief among the arguments which Davidson advanced in “Actions, Reasons, and 
Causes” (2001a), the essay which shattered a longstanding Wittgenstein-inspired 
consensus on anti-causalism, is an inference to the best explanation: when we ask why 
someone acted as they did, we do not just want to know a reason to perform the action, 
but we want to know which reason they actually acted on; and the best account of the 
                                                
3 Queloz (2017); see also Schroeder (2001), Hacker (2009), and Glock (2014). 
4 I thereby pursue the line of thought which Glock (2014, 42-43), at the end of a comparative study of 
Wittgenstein and Davidson on reasons for action, identifies as requiring further investigation. Tripodi 
(2015) pursues a similarly reconciliatory strategy from the other direction, as it were, by arguing that 
Davidson’s conception of intentional explanation is misleadingly described as a causalist one. 
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difference between these two kinds of reasons is that the latter was causally efficacious 
in bringing about the action. Davidson thus throws down the gauntlet against anti-
causalist accounts of action explanation by challenging them to differentiate between 
the following two cases: 
 (1) A has a reason to φ and φ-s for precisely that reason. 
 (2) A has a reason to φ and φ-s, but does not φ for that reason. 
If reasons are to explain actions, it will not suffice to observe that A φ-d and had a reason 
to φ: 
… for a person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, yet 
this reason not be the reason why he did it. Central to the relation between 
a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the 
action because he had the reason. (2001a, 9) 
What could enable us to differentiate between (1) and (2), Davidson asks, if not the fact 
that the reason in question was causally efficacious in bringing about A’s φ-ing? He 
concludes that “failing a satisfactory alternative, the best argument for a [causal] scheme 
… is that it alone promises to give an account of the ‘mysterious connection’ between 
reasons and actions” (2001a, 11). This is Davidson’s Challenge. It purports to show that 
intentional explanations are causal explanations because the reasons for which we act 
are the causes of our actions. 
 However, Davidson’s later writings suggest that his position is perhaps not as far 
removed from the Wittgensteinian view of intentional explanation as these historical 
dialects suggest. Davidson leaves ample room for the idea that intentional explanations 
are of a markedly different kind from those given in the natural sciences. In “Mental 
Events” (2001d), he makes it clear that no conceptual reduction of intentional to 
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physical explanation is to be had.5 Elsewhere, he insists that “there is an irreducible 
difference between psychological explanations that involve the propositional attitudes 
and explanation in sciences like physics and physiology” (2004, 101), and that “the 
methodology of history (or, for that matter, of any of the social sciences that treat 
individual human behaviour) differs markedly from the methodology of the natural 
sciences” (2005, 285). Davidson’s granting that “[b]eliefs and intentions are not little 
entities lodged in the brain” (1999, 654) also indicates his agreement with Wittgenstein 
in rejecting the hypostatisation of reasons for action as parts of “a hidden machine, say, 
a machine in [the] brain” (Waismann 1965, 122). Wittgenstein’s anti-causalism forms 
part of his crusade against what he regards as a misguided tendency to hypostatise  
psychological phenomena, and while he is adamant that reasons are not causes, he has 
little to say on whether intentional explanations are a species of causal explanation; and 
one can deny that reasons are causes, in the strict sense of figuring as relata in causal 
relations, while endorsing the weaker claim that intentional explanations are a species 
of causal explanation.6  
 This indicates that a rapprochement between Wittgensteinian anti-causalism about 
reasons and Davidsonian causalism about intentional explanation may be in the offing. 
And indeed, I shall argue that by distinguishing a narrow from a wide conception of 
causal explanation, we can maintain that the reasons for which we act are not causes, 
but that intentional explanations are causal explanations in virtue of citing features of 
persons associated with events standing in causal relations to actions. But paving the 
way for such a rapprochement requires defusing Davidson’s Challenge, since that 
                                                
5 This reflects Davidson’s belief in the anomalism of the mental: while causal relations are nomological 
in character, i. e. fall under strict laws, there are no strict laws relating mental and the physical events. In 
“Mental Events,” he aims to show how this is compatible with the idea that at least some mental events 
interact with physical events. 
6 As Alvarez (2007, 105) and Glock (2014) have noted. 
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argument purports to tie the intelligibility of intentional explanation to the causal 
efficacy of the reasons for which we act. It is therefore to the task of defusing Davidson’s 
Challenge using Wittgenstein’s anti-causalism that we first turn. 
 
1. A Wittgensteinian Response to Davidson’s Challenge 
Davidson’s Challenge to differentiate between a reason to φ and the reason one φ-ed is 
really two challenges: an epistemic challenge to tell the difference between a reason and 
the reason; and a metaphysical challenge to answer the constitutive question of what 
makes a reason the reason for which one acted.7 In this section, I argue that Davidson’s 
Challenge fails to settle the argument between the causalist and the anti-causalist, and 
thus fails to tie the intelligibility of intentional explanation to the causal efficacy of the 
reasons for which we act, because (a) Wittgenstein provides anti-causalists with the 
means to resist the challenge, and (b) causalists themselves struggle to spell out how 
reasons must cause actions if the agent is to act for that reason without presupposing 
the notion of acting for reasons. 
 A Wittgensteinian response to Davidson’s Challenge might start by noting, first, that 
explanations in terms of reasons serve to interpret some bodily movement as 
constituting a particular kind of action. The paradigmatic situation in which such 
explanations have a point and are called for is when a deed becomes a riddle to us 
(Wittgenstein 2009, §79). To be given an explanation in terms of reasons is to be given 
the “trains of thought” that lead to an action, which enables one to understand the 
                                                
7 One may doubt whether this distinction is available to interpretationists like Davidson who take the 
best guide to the ontology or nature of the mental to be the epistemology of the mental. Yet even on an 
interpretationist account of the mental, we can still distinguish between how we know someone is in a 
mental state and what it is to be in that state. 
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action (Wittgenstein 1982, §§92-94). An intentional explanation thus serves an 
interpretive function. It “gives the attitudinal conditions in terms of which to derive the 
understanding of the agent’s behaviour as the act that he performed” (Stoutland 1976, 
302). Providing an explanation for an action, and even denying an explanation for an 
action (“I’m leaving the room, but not because you tell me to” (Wittgenstein 2009, 
§487), elucidates the action’s meaning in light of the circumstances of the action and of 
how it fits within the wider pattern of the agent’s behaviour.  
 Second, for Wittgenstein, identifying the reason on which someone acted is a matter 
of the “circumstantial evidence” (2009, §488), of the context in which the action occurs 
and of how well a given reason helps us make sense of the overall pattern of the agent’s 
verbal and non-verbal behaviour. This circumstantial evidence includes: 
- what the agent said or did at the time; 
- what she said or did earlier or later, particularly when asked for reasons; 
- what reasons previously weighed with her in comparable circumstances; 
- what we take to be in or out of character for her; 
- what she would have said and done had she been asked what her reasons were;  
- her abilities (such as her ability to speak a language). 
Just as context is crucial to ascribing reasons to persons in general, it is crucial to 
determining the reason on which someone actually acted. Wittgenstein illustrates this 
in one of his lectures by imagining himself and one of his students, James Taylor, 
walking along a river, when suddenly, Taylor stretches out his arm and pushes 
Wittgenstein into the water. Puzzled, Wittgenstein asks Taylor “why he did this” (1966, 
22), and two explanations for Taylor’s action are proposed: “(1) He subconsciously 
hated the other man”, and “(2) He was pointing at something” (1966, 23). To decide 
between the two explanations, Wittgenstein goes on to argue, we look to the context of 
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the action, i.e. to what Taylor himself said was the reason that weighed with him in his 
deliberation, to how truthful Taylor was known to be about such things, to Taylor’s past 
behaviour, to the circumstances of the action, and to Taylor’s character; we would 
declare the second explanation to be correct if “he had never shown any unfriendly 
feelings, [if] a church-steeple and I were in his field of vision, and Taylor was known to 
be truthful” (1966, 23). 8  Interpretation is required to get us from mere motion to 
meaningful movement, and even when we have one description of such a movement 
(“he stretched out his arm”), that interpretation may not suffice to make sense of the 
action in the wider context. This is where we ask for explanation, and an intentional 
explanation provides a redescription of the action by presenting it as the expression of 
particular purposes and intentions. The function of intentional explanation, on this 
account, is to interpret deeds, and the correct intentional explanation is that which best 
makes sense of the overall patterns of the agent’s behaviour and utterances. 
 Within these patterns, a special role is played on Wittgenstein’s view by what the 
agent says his or her reasons were. Normally, the agent “cannot be mistaken in 
specifying his reason … we call the reason that which he gives as his reason” 
(Wittgenstein and Waismann 2003, 110): 
“Why are you turning out the light in your room?” I say: “Because I want to go to sleep”. He 
asks: “Are you sure?” And I reply: “I must surely know why I am doing it”. This certainty 
indicates that specifying a reason is the criterion for having this reason. (Wittgenstein and 
Waismann 2003, 31) 
                                                
8  Wittgenstein also remarks that it is in view of the larger context that an explanation in terms of 
unconscious reasons would be corroborated: namely if it “often happened” that when one person “was 
obviously pointing out something and pushed the other in the river”, “the person pushed in had a 
similarity with the father of the other person” (1966, 22-23). 
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The certainty in question does not reflect one’s privileged epistemic access to one’s 
practical deliberation, but rather one’s (defeasible) first-personal authority in stating 
what one’s reason is. As Wittgenstein puts it in the Blue Book: “In order to know the 
reason which you had for making a certain statement, for acting in a particular way, 
etc., no number of agreeing experiences is necessary” (1958, 15). In giving one’s reason, 
one makes an expressive rather than a descriptive move in the language game: one does 
not report a connection between a reason and the action it is a reason for, or “read it off 
from some other process which took place then” (2009, §637), “on grounds of self-
observation,” but rather voices one’s mind and thereby tells others something about 
oneself “which goes beyond what happened at that time”  (2009, §659), namely how the 
action fits within the larger pattern of one’s thought and behaviour. In this sense, one 
does not describe, but make a connection between what one did and why one did it  
(2009, §486; §§682-83).9 
 Of course, one may have reasons for what one did and still be silent as to what these 
reasons were, or make disingenuous, insincere, or self-deceived statements about what 
they were. But what then makes it true that one still had a reason for acting as one did, 
or that one is insincere, disingenuous, or self-deceived in specifying one’s reason, is the 
wider context of one’s verbal and non-verbal behaviour.10 These cases are derivative on 
                                                
9 For a more extensive discussion of Wittgenstein’s views on agents’ first-personal authority in giving 
reasons, see Queloz (2017).  
10 It is true that on this kind of patternalist account, there would be a point at which, if the agent were 
shifty and changeable enough—in the way that the eponymous character in Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew 
is, for example (Williams 2002, ch. 8)—the larger patterns of the agent’s behaviour would cease to cohere 
sufficiently for there to be a fact of the matter as to what the agent’s reason was. But the same is true on 
Davidson’s view: “if we are intelligibly to attribute attitudes and beliefs, or usefully to describe motions 
as behaviour, then we are committed to finding, in the pattern of behaviour, belief and desire, a large 
degree of rationality and consistency” (Davidson 2001e, 237). 
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the basic case in which the reason is “nothing more than just the one [the agent] gives 
when asked” (Wittgenstein 1979, 5).  
 This furnishes the anti-causalist with ample means to resists Davidson’s Challenge 
in both its epistemic and its metaphysical key.11 Taking up the terminology proposed 
by Glock (2014, 43), we can distinguish two different strands in this Wittgensteinian 
response to Davidson’s Challenge:  
Deliberationism: what distinguishes the reason on which someone acted from other 
reasons to act this way is that it is the reason that weighed the most in the agent’s 
deliberation.  
Patternalism: what distinguishes the reason on which someone acted from other 
reasons to act this way is that it is the reason that best makes sense of the overall 
pattern of the agent’s verbal and non-verbal behaviour. 
On a Wittgensteinian view, these two strategies are of course linked, for one way of 
spelling out the deliberationist strategy is in terms of patternalism: which reasons 
weighed the most in the agent’s deliberation is normally, though not necessarily or 
indefeasibly, determined by the agent’s truthful declarations or avowals of what these 
reasons were and how these fit into the wider patterns of the agent’s behaviour.  
 It is straightforward to see how this allows anti-causalists to respond to Davidson’s 
Challenge in its epistemic key. One finds out what the agent’s reason was by looking at 
what she said or did at the time, at what she said or did earlier or later, particularly when 
asked for reasons, and at what reasons previously weighed with her in comparable 
circumstances and assesses it against the background of what one knows to be in or out 
of character for this person.  
                                                
11 A conclusion endorsed also by Schroeder (2001). 
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 As for how anti-causalism fares with Davidson’s Challenge in its metaphysical key, 
the question is whether the difference between a reason there is for A to φ and the 
reason A φ-s can only be understood in terms of there being a causal connection 
between reason and action. The challenge is that of saying what the difference consists 
in rather than that of telling the difference—to spell out what makes true a claim of the 
form “A acted for this reason and not for that one.” The point of the challenge, from 
the causalist’s perspective, is that if we are to distinguish metaphysically between the 
reason for which one does something and a reason to do something, which in practice 
we are perfectly able to do, there must be a difference between the two; and this 
difference can, according to the causalist, lie only in the idea that one is causally 
efficacious while the other is not. 
 Yet on a Wittgensteinian understanding of what we are at when we give reasons, this 
is a conclusion the anti-causalist can resist. To give the reason for which one acted is to 
indicate a deliberative route, but not in the sense of specifying the process by which, 
causally, one in fact got to the action in virtue of the reason’s causal efficacy; rather, it 
shows how, rationally, one gets to the action in virtue of the rational connections the 
consideration cited bears to other considerations. It is only if reasons were mental states 
that both rationally and causally accounted for an action that giving one’s reasons for a 
past action would be equivalent to describing past psychological events or states of the 
agent. But as Wittgenstein insists, it is only in “some cases” that giving a reason means 
“telling the way which one has gone oneself” (1958, 14); crucially, it can also mean 
“describing a way which leads there and is in accordance with certain accepted rules” 
(1958, 14), but which one has not gone oneself. In these latter cases, giving reasons does 
not consist in reporting or recapitulating some psychological process of reasoning one 
has gone through. There are cases in which we act without consciously reflecting on 
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our reasons, but where we can nevertheless be said to act for reasons. Hence, what 
distinguishes the reason for which one acts from other reasons need not be its position 
in a network of causes. It might instead be its salient position in the pattern of the 
agent’s reasons as a whole. The agent’s reason stands out as the reason for the action 
not in the mechanical sense in which it causally accounts for what is done, but in the 
normative sense in which in her view, it trumps other reasons, and thereby rationally 
accounts for the action as what, on her judgment and all things considered, is to be 
done. The relativisation to the agent’s perspective is required if agents are not to be 
conceived of as unrealistically rational. If what reasons have weight from the agent’s 
perspective is determined by what the agent, in practice, implicitly treats as a reason 
and by what reasons she would give if asked (rather than by what reasons became 
explicit as occurrent thoughts in the agent’s practical deliberation), this relativisation 
does not conflict with Wittgenstein’s claim that the agent need not have her reasons in 
mind in order to act on them.12 
 The conclusion one reaches is that Wittgenstein gives anti-causalists the means to 
answer Davidson’s Challenge in both its epistemic and its metaphysical key. No appeal 
to causation is required either to determine that someone acted for one reason and not 
another, or to spell out what makes it the case that this is so. 
 What this Wittgensteinian response to Davidson’s Challenge brings out is that the 
two camps confronting each other in the causalism/anti-causalism debate are opposed 
in both temperament and method. Where the causalist’s guiding intuition is to explain 
action by zooming in on the agent and the mechanisms underlying her movements, the 
anti-causalist’s intuition is to zoom out to bring the larger patterns of behaviour into 
                                                
12 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this. 
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view. Where the causalist seeks to uncover the action’s triggers by analysing it into 
particular events, the anti-causalist seeks to explain it by striving for a synthetic 
understanding of the amalgam of human interaction.13 With a nod to Wittgenstein, 
Davidson in fact concedes that when we explain an action by reference to reasons, we 
redescribe the action and place it in a pattern. Yet he insists that there is no conflict 
between the two strategies. He points out that “events are often redescribed in terms of 
their causes” (2001a, 10). If someone was injured, for example, we could “redescribe 
this event ‘in terms of a cause’ by saying he was burned” (2001a, 10). In other words, a 
description which elucidates the meaning of an action can do so by reference to the 
causes of the action. Davidson’s success in reinstating causalism may well derive in part 
from his conciliatory assent to most of what anti-causalists have to say about the 
interpretive function of intentional explanation. In what looks like a synthesis, he takes 
anti-causalist insights on board while insisting that they form no obstacle to intentional 
explanations’ being causal explanations. 
 A possible line of objection to this Wittgensteinian response to Davidson’s Challenge 
is indicated by William Child: 
The fact that we can effect a distinction by using a set of criteria which are 
not explicitly causal is clearly compatible with the distinction’s being a 
distinction between things with a causal history of one sort and those with 
a causal history of another. For example, I can tell the difference between 
the song of a garden warbler and the song of a blackcap by applying a test 
                                                
13 The Wittgenstein-inspired expressivist approach to value is described by Simon Blackburn along these 
lines: “To understand the value of a piece of money it is no good staring at it. It is necessary to understand 
the processes of human economic behaviour. You need to approach the token not with a microscope and 
a scalpel, but with an eye for large patterns of human interactions” (1998, 50). 
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which is not explicitly causal; how sustained is the song, and what is its 
pitch? But the distinction thus effected is a distinction between songs with 
different aetiologies; the one is produced by garden warblers, the other by 
blackcaps. (Child 1994, 96-97) 
Child adds that it is open to the causalist to insist that the considerations used to draw 
the distinction are in fact causal, so that the argument begs the question against the 
causal view in any case (97). This may well be the case, but the causalist begs the 
question in just the same measure by arguing merely that our effecting the distinction 
without causal criteria is compatible with the distinction’s being one between things 
with different aetiologies. Child’s argument might establish that different aetiologies 
are possible despite the fact that we draw the distinction without resorting to them, but 
what the causalist needs to demonstrate is that drawing the distinction requires the 
aetiologies to be different. As long as both causalist and anti-causalist interpretations 
are compatible with the data, but not entailed by it, Davidson’s Challenge fails to decide 
the issue.  
 It would in any case be imprudent to pin too much of one’s faith in causalism on the 
possibility of differentiating between a reason to φ and the reason one φ-ed in causal 
terms. A decade after the publication of “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” Davidson 
himself admitted that the causalist account led him to “despair of spelling out … the 
way in which attitudes must cause actions if they are to rationalize the action” (2001c, 
79). The problem, originally pointed out by Anthony Kenny (1975), and which 
Davidson deemed “insurmountable,” lies in the possibility of “wayward causal chains,” 
which invalidate the conclusion that “if attitudes that would rationalize x cause an agent 
to do x, then he does x intentionally” (2001c, 79). In other words, the causalist cannot 
distinguish between the following two cases: 
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  (3) A has a reason to φ and φ-s for that reason. 
  (4) A has a reason to φ and φ-s because of that reason. 
(3) is the well-behaved case, in which the attitudes that rationalise φ-ing cause the agent 
to φ, and the agent φ-s intentionally, i.e. for that reason. But the causalist account is 
powerless to distinguish such right causal chains from wrong causal chains as typified 
by (4). In these wayward cases, the combination of beliefs and desires (what Davidson 
calls a “primary reason”) both rationalises and causes the action, and yet the action is 
not done intentionally, i.e. it is done only because of that reason, but not for that reason. 
Davidson provides the following example: 
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding 
another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on 
the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want 
might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it might 
be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it 
intentionally. (2001c, 79) 
The conclusion many, including Davidson himself, have drawn from this is that there 
is no way of spelling out the “right way” in which reasons must cause actions if the agent 
is to act for that reason without presupposing the notion of acting for reasons.14 The 
promise of a causalist “account of the ‘mysterious connection’ between reason and 
action” (2001a, 11) so far remains unfulfilled. 
 Moreover, as Wittgenstein also remarks, there may be two reasons which could, with 
equal justification, be said to be the ones on which the agent acted, and “[b]oth 
                                                
14 See Davidson (2001e, 232-33) and Child (1994, 98). 
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explanations may be correct” (1966, 23). Wittgenstein gives the example of someone 
whose action could be rationalised either by a conscious reason or by an unconscious 
one, even if the two explanations came into conflict with one another: “The 
explanations could in a sense be contradictory and yet both be correct … One could be 
love and one could be hatred” (1966, 23). In view of these reminders of the way we 
normally go on, and which philosophy tends to dispose us to forget, the insistence that 
there needs to be a single, causally efficacious reason appears as a theoretical artefact, 
generated perhaps by the pressure on the causalist account to identify the salient cause 
of the action. When we see our actions in a way uncorrupted by the theoretical 
oversimplifications of philosophy, Wittgenstein contends, there is no issue with the fact 
that there may be language games which function by deploying two utterly different but 
equally operative motives (1966, 23).15 
 The upshot is perhaps best summed up by saying that Davidson’s Challenge is 
effective primarily as a way to preach to the converted, but that it fails to tie the 
intelligibility of intentional explanation to the causal efficacy of the reasons for which 
we act, because Wittgenstein provides anti-causalists with the means to resist the 
challenge, and causalists themselves struggle to spell out how reasons must cause 
actions if the agent is to act for that reason without presupposing the notion of acting 
for reasons. 
 
                                                
15 As Wittgenstein writes in Culture and Value, the only way “for us to avoid prejudice or vacuity in our 
claims” is to take any single model in terms of which we seek to understand a phenomenon “as an object 
of comparison—a measuring rod as it were—within our way of looking at things,” and “not as a 
preconception to which everything must conform” (1998, 30). To do otherwise is to fall victim to “the 
dogmatism into which philosophy can so easily degenerate” (1998, 30). 
 16 
2. A Rapprochement between Davidson and Wittgenstein 
While Wittgenstein’s writings contain the seeds of arguments to resist Davidson’s 
Challenge itself, one should not lose sight of the fact that they do little to answer what 
might be called the master argument for causalism which provides the background 
rationale for Davidson’s advocacy of causalism about intentional explanation. The 
linchpin for this argument is that intentional explanations are still explanations of why 
something happened—as opposed to explanations of why something counts as 
something else or has a particular property, such as why parking in such-and-such a 
way is illegal (Child 1994, 91).16 The master argument for a causalist conception of 
intentional explanation then runs as follows: 
An intentional explanation is an explanation of why something happened. 
No non-causal explanation can explain why something happened. 
Therefore, intentional explanations must be causal explanations. 
In order to resist the conclusion, anti-causalists about intentional explanation might 
deny either of the premises. If they choose to deny the first premise, the burden falls on 
them to show what the explanatory import of intentional explanations is: intentional 
explanations may help us grasp the meaning or the significance of an action, but how 
can intentional explanations really explain why A φ-d if they fail to explain why the 
action occurred? If anti-causalists deny the master argument’s second premise, they can 
reverse the argument and reject it as follows: intentional explanations are not causal; 
they do explain why something happened; therefore, some explanations of why 
something happened are not causal. But in response, causalists can insist that for any 
                                                
16 Which is not to say that everybody agrees that intentional explanations are explanations of why 
something happened. Dissenters include Hornsby (2004) and Sandis (2011). 
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supposedly non-causal explanation of why something happened, however informative, 
we can still ask why the particular event in question occurred when and how it did, and 
if the event has a cause, the answer will, if only indirectly, have to provide information 
about its causal history, and will therefore be a causal explanation.17 If anti-causalists 
want to deny that intentional explanations are causal, therefore, it seems that they must 
deny that intentional explanations are explanations of why something happened. 
 If anti-causalism about intentional explanation comes at the cost of denying this 
prima facie plausible assumption, it is worth asking whether there is a textual basis to 
the conclusion that Wittgenstein himself goes down this path, or whether he is best seen 
as taking a rather more noncommittal position which leaves room for a conciliatory 
view of intentional explanation. Wittgenstein is clearly rightly claimed as an authority 
by anti-causalists about reasons, who maintain that reasons are not a species of causes.18 
But this leaves open the question whether he is also rightly claimed as an authority by 
anti-causalists about intentional explanation. As Alvarez (2007, 105) notes, one can 
deny that reasons are causes, in the strict sense of figuring themselves as relata in causal 
relations, while endorsing the weaker claim that intentional explanations are a species 
of causal explanation. 
 There can be little doubt that Wittgenstein’s work brings out a profound difference 
between intentional explanations and the causal explanations of physics. He emphasises 
that to regard bodily movements not under their mechanical aspect, but under their 
aspect as reason-guided actions, involves viewing them in the context of rule-governed 
practices and institutions (Waismann 1965, 124; Wittgenstein 2009, §§197-99). This 
                                                
17 See Lewis (1986) and Child (1994, 91-93) for further defence of the view that all explanations of events 
are causal explanations. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for comments on this. 
18 Queloz (2016, 2017), Schroeder (2001), Hacker (2009), and Glock (2014). 
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emerges from the combination of the following two ideas: on the one hand, as we have 
seen, Wittgenstein contends that the reasons that explain and determine the meaning 
of an action are given, and therefore constrained, by the way in which the action fits 
into the larger pattern of the agent’s character and history: they must cohere with the 
context of the action, with the agent’s personality and with her past and subsequent 
behaviour (on pain of either being unintelligible or of casting doubt on her sincerity or 
self-knowledge). On the other hand, he takes the norms of reasoning which delineate 
what rational connections a reason stands in to be context-bound: they depend on the 
language game, that is, on the interactive and rule-guided complex of activities and 
language-use within which something is adduced as a reason: “Not until there is a 
language game are there reasons” (1980, §689), and a “reason is a reason only inside the 
game” (1979, 4). Taken together, these two ideas imply that if what action a movement 
constitutes depends on the reasons that explain it, and if what reasons can explain it in 
turn depends on our practices and institutions, then the characterisation of movements 
as actions will be as context-bound as the characterisation of propositions as reasons. If 
we want to say, as Stoutland notably does, that “what constitutes an agent’s bodily 
movements as intentional under a description is their being explained by the agent’s 
reasons for acting under that description” (2010, 56),19 then the horizon of possible 
actions will in part be set by the horizon of possible reasons for action, which is in turn 
set by the context of human customs and institutions: 
An intention is embedded in a setting, in human customs and institutions. 
If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play 
a game of chess. (Wittgenstein 2009, §337) 
                                                
19 See also Hurley (1989, 97-98). 
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The institution of chess is required in order to get from the mere movement to the move 
within the game. Likewise, making a mark on a piece of paper can be described 
physically or physiologically, but whether making a mark on a piece of paper is writing 
one’s name, and whether writing one’s name is signing a letter, a cheque, a contract or 
a will, depends on the social customs and institutions it is embedded in. Absent these 
customs and institutions, nothing would count as performing these actions, no matter 
what went on in the mind or brain of the agent (Hacker 2011, 69). Thus, a key 
characteristic of intentional explanations which is alien to the causal explanations of 
physics is that it refers to rule-governed practices and institutions, and thus to the 
agents’ local perspectives and idiosyncrasies. By contrast, the hard sciences’ causal 
explanations of the behaviour of nature are not context-bound in this way. They strive 
for a representation of the world “which is to the largest possible extent independent of 
the local perspectives or idiosyncrasies of enquirers” (Williams 2006, 184). 
 Yet even granted this difference, it does not follow that intentional explanations are 
not a kind of causal explanation. Whether they are or not depends largely on how wide 
a notion of causal explanation one has in mind; and this brings into view the possibility 
of holding on to the anti-causalist insights suggesting that intentional explanations are 
sui generis while broadening and shoring up one’s conception of causal explanation to 
make room for a sui generis mode of causal explanation. In the remainder of this paper, 
I sketch out in barest outline how such a rapprochement between Wittgensteinian anti-
causalism and Davidsonian causalism can be achieved. 
 Following Strawson (1992b) and Davidson (2001b), we can distinguish between (i) 
the network of events or circumstances standing in extensional, natural relations of 
cause and effect, and (ii) the network of descriptions standing in intensional, non-
natural relations of explanans and explanandum. While causal relations are extensional 
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and hold between events independently of how they are described, relations of 
explanation (causal or otherwise) hold between events as described, which means that 
an event described in one way may provide an explanation for another, while the same 
event described in another way fails to do so. It may be that a certain event e1 caused a 
certain event e2, but it is the fact that e1 occurred which explains the fact that e2 
occurred.20 Consider the following example: 
(5) Turing died because he bit into an apple. 
(6) Turing died because he ingested cyanide. 
While (5) and (6) refer to the same two causally related events, only (6) causally explains 
Turing’s death, while (5) does not. The explanatory force of causal explanation depends 
on the right description of explanans and explanandum. Moreover, the explanatory 
power of causal explanations derives from and depends on the obtaining of causal 
relations between events: it is because the opening of the fridge door caused the ice to 
melt that the fact that the fridge door was opened explains the fact that the ice melted 
and thus forms the reason why it happened. Behind every causal explanation there are 
two causally related events. 
 But this still allows us to distinguish between a narrow and a wide conception of 
causal explanation, and using this distinction, we can resolve the stalemate between 
anti-causalists who are impressed by the thought that reasons cannot be causes and 
causalists who are equally impressed by the thought that intentional explanations must 
be causal explanations. 
 On the narrow conception, an explanation is a causal explanation just in case it 
explains why something happened and the fact acting as explanans either directly 
                                                
20 Strawson (1992a, 112-13); Alvarez (2010, 29-30); Davidson (2001b, 151). 
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names or points to the event that stands in a causal relation to the explanandum. For 
example, if the fact that the temperature dropped explains the fact that the ice melted, 
the two causally related events—the drop and the melting—are explicitly mentioned. 
In other cases, the explanation might mention a preceding step in the causal chain, such 
as the fridge door’s being opened (which points to the drop in temperature by reference 
to its cause). But as long as the notion of causal explanation involves the requirement 
that it more or less directly—we can think of the distinction as graded rather than 
sharp—name the causal relata at issue, denying that the reasons for which we act can 
themselves figure as such relata will bar one from thinking of intentional explanations 
as causal explanations. 
 On the wide conception, by contrast, an explanation will still count as a causal 
explanation if it explains why something happened and the fact acting as explanans only 
mentions features of the situation which are relevant by being associated with the cause. 
This wider conception of causal explanation thus covers what Child calls “feature-citing 
explanations” (1994, 103). For example, the fact that the driver was drunk explains the 
crash, and does so even if one has no knowledge of the proximate cause of the crash. 
Similarly, mentioning a property of something can figure in a causal explanation 
without our having to think of the property itself as a cause: 
Suppose I strike this glass a smart blow, and it breaks. We can explain its 
breaking by saying that it was fragile. The cause of the glass’s breaking was 
its being struck. “It broke because it was fragile” is a causal explanation, 
whose truth depends on the obtaining of a causal relation—the causal 
relation between the striking and the breaking. (Child 1994, 125) 
In this example, the explanans does not explicitly mention an event, but a property of 
the glass—its fragility. The item which is causally related to the action and the item 
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which causally explains it fall apart. Yet one still explains why something happened—
why the glass broke—by making it intelligible why its being struck caused its breaking. 
 It seems to me, therefore, that one must refrain from concluding, as some have done 
(Hacker 2011, 69), that Wittgenstein denies that intentional explanations are a species 
of causal explanations. If one allows for the fact that the item which is causally related 
to the action and the item which causally explains it can fall apart, then intentional 
explanations can still be a form of causal explanation. Intentional explanations may be 
sui generis, as Wittgenstein intimated; but one way in which they can be sui generis is 
by being a sui generis mode of causal explanation. Nothing Wittgenstein says bars 
intentional explanations from being a species of causal explanations. 
 On this wider conception of causal explanation, the possibility of a rapprochement 
between Wittgenstein and Davidson emerges, achievable by combining the view that 
reasons are not causes with the view that intentional explanations are causal 
explanations. We can maintain, with Wittgenstein, that the reasons for which we act 
are not causes, because they are the contents of our propositional attitudes—what we 
believe or what desire (Glock 2014; Queloz 2017); but if feature-citing explanations can 
be causal explanations without our having to think of the features themselves as causes, 
then so can explanations in terms of propositional attitudes, and we can therefore also 
maintain, with Davidson, that intentional explanations are causal explanations. Facts 
about propositional attitudes—not about their content, but about the attitudes of 
believing or desiring themselves, such as that A believes that p or that A desires that q—
can figure in causal explanations of actions on the assumption that they are associated 
with events standing in causal relations to the action to be explained. 
 On this conciliatory view, intentional explanations still count as a form of causal 
explanation because facts about propositional attitudes have causal import. Mentioning 
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features or properties of persons, such as the fact that Taylor believes that the steeple 
would please Wittgenstein and desires that he be pleased, would still causally explain 
the fact that Taylor pointed to it by rendering it intelligible why his noticing the steeple 
caused him to stretch out his arm. 
 In mentioning propositional attitudes as parts of a causal explanation, we need not 
take ourselves to be “limning the units that a future neuroscience will use in identifying 
the causes of behaviour” (Robinson 1990, 51). As Davidson writes, “it is changes in the 
attitudes, which are events, which are the often unmentioned causes” (1993, 288). But 
he adds that beliefs and desires should not be thought of as “little entities lodged in the 
brain,” and therefore, 
since beliefs and desires aren’t entities, it is a metaphor to speak of their changing, and hence 
an extension of that metaphor to speak of them as causes and effects. What happens is that 
the descriptions of the agent change over time. The relevant entity that changes is the person, 
and there seems no difficulty in supposing that these changes have a physical description 
(Davidson 1999, 654). 
We can still acknowledge the profound differences between intentional explanations 
on the one hand and causal explanations of the kind advanced in neurophysiology on 
the other. Indeed, it would be surprising if there were no such differences, since they 
reflect the fact that intentional explanations are tailored to our needs in everyday social 
interaction, and that they pick out the features of persons and their behaviour which 
are of most interest to us in these contexts. In another context, such as a 
neurophysiological investigation, other features are of interest, and it makes sense that 
we should advance causal explanations of an entirely different kind there. In each case, 
we turn our inquiries around “on the pivot of our real need” (Wittgenstein 2009, §108). 
But acknowledging these differences in kinds of explanations and the needs they answer 
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to falls short of denying that intentional explanations are explanations of why 
something happened. There seems to be room, therefore, to bring together Davidsonian 
causalism about intentional explanation and Wittgensteinian anti-causalism about 
reasons in a way that does justice to insights on both sides. 
 
Conclusion 
I have been arguing for three claims in this paper. First, Wittgenstein furnishes anti-
causalists with the means required to answer Davidson’s Challenge and to resist the 
idea that the intelligibility of intentional explanation depends on reasons being causes. 
Second, while Wittgenstein offers us reasons to think that intentional explanations are 
sui generis, these reasons fall short of entailing that intentional explanations cannot be 
a species of causal explanation. And third, in response to the Master Argument to the 
effect that intentional explanations must be causal explanations of some kind, we can 
resolve the stalemate between Wittgensteinian anti-causalists and Davidsonian 
causalists by distinguishing between a narrow and a wide conception of causal 
explanation. 
 On the wide conception of causal explanation, a rapprochement between 
Wittgenstein and Davidson can be achieved by maintaining that the reasons for which 
we act are not causes, but that intentional explanations are causal explanations in virtue 
of citing features of persons associated with events standing in causal relations to 
actions. This, to be sure, is no more than a sketch, and a far more detailed treatment of 
Wittgenstein’s and Davidson’s positions than I have room for here would be required 
to flesh out the precise extent to which they are compatible. What even a cursory 
treatment of these two figureheads of causalism and anti-causalism reveals, however, is 
that they yield much less of a basis for disagreement than historical dialectics suggest—
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indeed, that causalism and anti-causalism are profitably seen as complementing rather 
than contradicting one another. 
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